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Terrorists’ technology choices are a key part of their ability to create fear in target 
populations and audiences. Terrorists’ interaction with technologies that perform key 
functions within modern society – e.g., communications or infrastructures – can also be 
strategies through which they can produce damage and fear. It is the way the terrorist 
chooses to apply technologies – to cause death and destruction – that sets him apart 
from the criminal who may be comparably armed and equipped but who uses those 
technologies for personal or material gain. For homeland security organizations,1 
responses to terrorist threats frequently gravitate toward the use of defensive technical 
systems. Significant sums of public and private funds have been allocated for 
development and fielding of security technologies and reduction of societal 
vulnerabilities.  Making good decisions about investments in defensive systems – many 
of which are costly and intended to reduce the threat of terrorist attack over the long 
term – requires understanding the interaction between the technology strategies of the 
terrorist and those of the organizations charged with defending against them.  
Technical aspects of the fight between states and non-state groups are frequently 
portrayed as a discrete interaction between the capabilities of the terrorist and those of 
the defender. The vehicle bomb is pitted against the perimeter security and any 
protective blast-resistant features built into its target; the anthrax-containing letter 
against the detectors in the mail system; the weapon smuggled in hand luggage against 
the technologies and training of airport security systems and personnel. At the end of 
this one-on-one interaction between weapon and defense, the attacker and defender 
step back to see if the terrorist was successful. Drilling deeper, however, makes looking 
at the fight as a set of discrete interactions appear increasingly artificial. Examination of 
the technological elements of terrorism invariably highlights the dynamic nature of the 
problems faced by the defense. The bomb planted by a terrorist group tomorrow will 
frequently differ from the bomb planted today: the terrorists change the explosive 
composition, modify the detonator circuitry, and alter the tactics used. The next day, the 
bomb may be discarded entirely as the group shifts to new attack modes, alternative 
weapons, and novel tactics.   
Some of these adaptations will have nothing to do with the actions taken by the 
defender, resulting simply from the desire of the terrorists to be more effective or lethal. 
Detonator modifications may be an attempt to reduce premature explosions that kill 
only the terrorists. The appearance of a new weapon may simply mean that the group is 
seizing an opportunity, i.e. through theft, purchase, or gift; the organization obtains a 
new tool and wants to use it. Frequently, however, terrorists’ adaptation has everything 
to do with the steps taken to defeat them. New remote-control initiators are needed 
because the defender is jamming the groups’ current detonator or standoff weapons are 
acquired because security measures keep the terrorists away from desirable targets.   
The opportunity for each side of the conflict to influence the other means the 
interaction between them is more complex and much richer than merely a sequential set 
of discrete clashes – and that defensive planning cannot be approached as if the 
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terrorism problem can be “solved” if simply the right defensive measure can be crafted 
and deployed. At the minimum, it is a multi-turn game involving many distinct players, 
where future clashes are informed by past actions – and by attempts to foresee future 
actions. But the depth of interaction goes further still: neither side limits its activities to 
perfecting its own future strategies based on the outcome of previous clashes, but also 
seeks to shape the environment of its opponent, even in the absence of direct 
interactions between them.   
This bi-directional interaction – the terrorist shaping the environment of the 
defender and vice versa – can be viewed as a process of coevolution.2 In nature, 
coevolution is defined as reciprocal changes that occur to species that interact in the 
same environment. Coevolution occurs between species that compete – e.g., predators 
and their prey – where changes in one produce selective pressure for changes in the 
other. In biological processes these changes are genetic and are produced through 
natural variation, recombination, and selection. Changes arise; those that are beneficial 
are rewarded with survival and those that are not die out. Similar forces can drive 
organizational change,3 with the pressures exerted by each side on the other punishing 
poor technology or other choices.   
It is our argument that thinking about the interaction of terrorist groups and security 
organizations in these coevolutionary terms is useful, particularly for analysts in 
organizations charged with designing security approaches and making investments in 
security technologies.  Building on the results of a research effort at RAND focused on 
terrorists’ technology behaviors,4 we argue that such approach would appear 
particularly valuable for understanding threats to the performance of counterterrorism 
technologies, identifying opportunities to shape terrorist behavior in ways that are 
advantageous for security efforts, and can to help identify more robust and, potentially, 
less resource intensive approaches for homeland security technology design.  In the 
following sections, we first explore terrorist choices and their implications for defensive 
thinking, and then transition to considering paths for creating “evolutionarily robust” 
defensive approaches.    
PRESSURE ON THE DEFENDER – TERRORISTS’ TECHNOLOGY 
STRATEGIES 
Choices made by terrorists are a primary determinant of the value and success of 
defensive efforts. Seeking to understand the drivers of terrorist technology strategies 
and identify likely future adaptations creates long-term challenges for security planning.  
The nature of terrorist groups poses difficulties for doing so, however. Looking across a 
range of groups and technologies, three central challenges are apparent:   
• Terrorist incentives for adopting or rejecting new technologies are rarely 
observable or obvious, limiting the ability of planners to predict terrorist 
innovation trajectories; 
• Terrorists have strong incentives to adapt well, and have identified multiple 
strategies for adaptation; and 
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• Terrorists confront defensive actions directly, degrading the utility and protective 
value of those actions.  
Terrorists Have Varied Technology Incentives 
Among analysts examining terrorist behavior, there is broad acceptance that terrorists 
adapt and evolve over time, though the forces that shape that adaptation are hardly 
transparent. This lack of transparency has provoked debate about the incentives for 
terrorist innovation, with evident uncertainty surrounding paths for future innovation. 
In considering terrorist weapons choices, many analysts have focused on the utility of 
novel and advanced weapons to terrorist groups, suggesting there will be enduring 
incentives for terrorist groups to seek them out and use them.5 Others point out that 
most terrorists appear to be “operationally conservative,” predominantly using basic 
technologies like the gun and the bomb, suggesting that incentives for innovation may 
not be particularly strong.6 Debates about the current terrorist threat and the potential 
for terrorist use of advanced or unconventional weapons can be viewed through this lens 
– where the view of terrorists as innovative or conservative frames assessment of the 
level of threat. 
Though apparently contradicting one another, these two views of terrorist technology 
decision making do not, in fact, conflict. In selecting what technologies to pursue, 
terrorists’ strategies will undoubtedly be governed by a judgment about how the benefits 
of a technology compare with what is involved in obtaining it, what risks are associated 
with doing so, and on how attractive a new technology looks compared with other 
tactical and technological options available to the group.  While terrorist groups may not 
necessarily think about these decisions in these terms, this decision process can be 
thought of as involving a comparison of the apparent costs and benefits7 of acquiring the 
new technology.8 Even if that comparison is implicit rather than an explicit, and will 
almost certainly be based on cost and benefit criteria that are idiosyncratic to the 
terrorist group, cost/benefit perceptions will underlie decision making. In this paper, we 
will use the language of costs and benefits to think through terrorist decisionmaking, 
even if actual decisions in groups may not approach anything like a formal comparison 
and may involve both costs and benefits that are unique to the groups involved. In some 
situations, the benefit of novelty will outweigh the costs and risks associated with it;9 in 
others, “tried and true” technologies will be good enough, particularly if there are many 
ways to apply those technologies in its operations.   
Given the risks inherent to terrorist activities – and the terrorists’ desire that 
operations be successful – there will always be tradeoffs between novel technologies and 
dependable alternatives. Similar tradeoffs will exist for individual technology choices, 
where the terrorists’ assessment of their costs, benefits, and risks will determine 
whether the group pursues one weapon over another, uses cellular phones for 
communication or relies on e-mail, and so on. Differences in the environments of 
individual groups, or of different factions within the terrorist organization, will shape 
assessments and determine which technology will be chosen.   
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As a result, while some generalizations about likely terrorist pathways can be made – 
e.g., analysts can assess the variety of technologies potentially useful to terrorists,  
articulate why some might be more attractive than others, and rule out some entirely – 
many possible paths will always remain. The influence of “wild card” external 
influences, such as other terrorist groups that willingly act as a source of technologies 
for others, can shift the apparent costs, benefits and risks of technologies and 
significantly influence such judgments.10 Differences in groups’ environmental 
conditions (i.e., factors that shape their decisions about technology acquisition) could 
therefore produce markedly different outcomes from the perspective of the security 
planner and make it difficult to put bounds around groups’ likely technology strategies. 
Terrorists Have Strong Incentives to Adapt Well and Varied 
Strategies for Doing So 
Returning to the evolutionary analogy introduced in the opening of this paper, when 
they are challenged by strong anti- and counter-terrorism measures, terrorist groups 
have strong incentives to adapt to maintain their effectiveness and to survive. When 
faced by a change in its environment, an organization must adapt quickly. When the 
stakes are high and the change threatens the viability of the organization, speed is 
critical. To respond quickly, one of two conditions must exist: (1) a group must already 
have solutions to problems that can be used immediately,11 or (2) it must develop 
solutions quickly. Developing solutions rapidly depends on how well the group learns 
and implements its learning.12 Groups that learn well can be proactive in shaping their 
own environment rather than reacting to exogenous change; those that cannot may be 
unable to adapt fast enough to survive the environmental shift. Looking across groups 
that have been successful in their learning efforts, we have defined three broad 
technology strategies representing different combinations of these two elements:13 
1. Versatility 
Versatile technology strategies focus on technologies that are suitable for a wide 
variety of operational contexts and tactical applications. “Guns and bombs” are 
examples of technologies that can be used in many different types of operations.  
Versatile capabilities are therefore transferable if the operations they are 
currently employed in are denied to the terrorist. This transferability enables 
rapid adaptation to certain types of environmental change. For example, it has 
been observed that many predators in nature are generalists to enable facile 
switching among prey types as environmental conditions shift.14 However, 
relying on versatility may limit the ability to adapt in other circumstances as it 
depends on the availability of substitute targets or operations where the 
technology is applicable.    
2. Specialization  
Specialized technology strategies focus on developing high levels of capability in 
specific areas.  Specialization is required to respond to some types of change. For 
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example, as a result of jamming of radio detonators for their bombs, many 
terrorist organizations have been forced to make electronic modifications to 
circumvent the countermeasures. Doing so requires a level of specialized 
understanding of those systems, and a group without that knowledge could not 
adapt.15  Specialization may therefore enable adaptation in circumstances where 
relying on versatile technologies may fail. However, it may take time – since 
adaptation may involve “opening up” and altering the technologies that the group 
is using. Furthermore, specialization requires resource commitments to develop 
expertise and knowledge. This trade between the benefits of specialization 
(getting much better at a given task) and the costs (reducing performance for 
other tasks) can be observed in natural systems as well.16 Environmental shifts 
might also eliminate the value of a specialty (e.g., a group that made the choice to 
specialize in one attack mode would pay a steep price if security measures 
subsequently made it impossible to use it on desirable targets).17  
3. Variety 
Variety-based technology strategies focus on maintaining a broad range of 
technology options to draw upon as required. In some cases, variety can be 
provided to the terrorist group by the market: when a range of commercial 
technologies for functions like communications are available, terrorists can 
switch among them as needed. Maintaining other variety can require on-going 
resource commitments (e.g., maintaining expertise in small-unit armed assault 
operations), though others may be less resource-intensive (e.g., groups returning 
to using command wire bombs as alternatives to radio detonation). The choice by 
a group to be a “jack of all trades” and maintain many different capabilities may 
limit its ability to develop high levels of expertise in any one area or technology.  
Separating technology strategies into categories does not imply that individual terrorist 
organizations choose only one of these strategies. Large organizations can pursue more 
than one simultaneously, e.g., training much of the group in versatile technologies while 
isolated elements are allowed to specialize. Similarly, how the boundaries are drawn 
around a “technology” matter – e.g., while bombs as an element of operations are a 
versatile technology pursued by almost all terrorist groups, bomb components may be 
the focus of specialization activities. 
Terrorists Take On the Defense Directly 
Though weapons choices are a key part of terrorists’ technology strategies, a key driver 
for adaptive behavior and evolution are the actions taken by the defense. Looking across 
a variety of terrorist organizations, a similar set of strategies can be identified for how 
these groups evolve in response to defensive measures: 18 
1. Altering operational practices 
By changing the ways it acts or designs its operations, a terrorist group may 
degrade the value of a security measure. Such changes frequently include efforts 
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to hide from the technologies. Such options are particularly potent for 
technologies that must be “triggered” by detection of the terrorist (versus static 
defenses that are “always on”).  The observation of such behaviors in biological 
systems has resulted in definition of a specific category of coevolution, 
“information coevolution,” capturing the efforts of organisms to hide from others’ 
detection capabilities (and the resulting pressure on the other creatures to 
heighten those detection capabilities in response.)19    
2. Making technological changes or substitutions  
By modifying its own technologies, acquiring new ones, or substituting new 
technologies for those in use, a terrorist group may be able to neutralize or 
circumvent a defense. The wide variety of applicable “off-the-shelf” technologies 
for many terrorist applications facilitates this strategy.20 
3. Avoiding the defensive technology 
Rather than modifying how it operates, a terrorist group may simply move its 
operations to an area not covered by the defense. Such displacement changes the 
distribution of terrorism and, while this may constitute successful protection in 
the area where the technology is deployed, the ability to shift operations 
elsewhere limits the influence the technology can have on the overall threat 
level.21  
4. Attacking the defensive technology 
If appropriate avenues are available, a terrorist group may attempt to destroy or 
damage a defensive technology. Groups may also attempt to exploit the 
technology to “turn it against the defender” by creating false alarms to waste 
resources, tire defenders, or desensitize the system. 
Just as the three fundamental offensive technology strategies above constitute a menu 
from which an organization can build its strategy, groups facing defensive pressures can 
deploy these strategies in response. Extending the coevolutionary analogy, these 
mechanisms represent the way the terrorist selectively pressures the defender.   
IMPLICATIONS FOR HOMELAND SECURITY TECHNOLOGY STRATEGIES 
From the perspective of defensive planning, the variation in terrorists’ technology 
strategies means that homeland security organizations will always face a heterogeneous 
threat. For any given terrorist cell or group, local influences on costs, benefits, and risks 
of new technologies will make it difficult to generalize about likely technology strategies. 
Contemporary shifts in the structures and characteristics of groups – for example, 
terrorism inspired by broader movements (e.g., global jihadist, radical 
environmentalism, and others) – reinforce the likelihood of variety in technology 
decisions as weapon and other technology selections are based on idiosyncratic 
rationales.22 For large enough movements, this could produce dynamics not dissimilar 
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from evolution by natural selection: disaggregated decision making by individual cells 
producing extremely broad variation in technology strategies, with counterterrorist 
efforts exerting selective pressure on the results.   
Terrorist interaction with defensive measures means that defenders face an 
additional and varied threat to their own actions and the defender is at a disadvantage.  
To plan its actions, the defense must attempt to predict the terrorists’ responses.  
Particularly if defensive measures are open to observation,23 the terrorists need only to 
wait and craft appropriate countermeasures. The terrorists are largely in control of 
when they interact with defensive measures – they get “last move advantage.” For 
systems that allow repeated interaction at an acceptable level of risk and, therefore, the 
chance to test them and experiment with countermeasures, this advantage can be 
important. There are also asymmetries in resource requirements: defensive actions, 
particularly for large and populous nations like the United States, are frequently costly 
and require long lead times. Those costs make attempts to defend everything against 
every threat untenable, while the terrorists’ efforts potentially create a high price for 
making flawed decisions about how and when to defend specific potential targets. 
Given the difficulties posed by terrorists’ adaptive behavior, actions to limit such 
groups’ ability to adapt and learn are often one goal of counterterrorism action.24 Given 
the breadth of the terrorist threat, it is unlikely that such action will significantly reduce 
the heterogeneity in the threat faced by defenders. How should homeland security 
organizations responsible for defending the country against terrorism respond to the 
breadth of terrorists’ technology strategies and their capability to evolve over time? Our 
recent research suggests three possible paths.25 
1. Focus on defensive strategies that can adapt, therefore making it possible to 
counter adaptation by terrorist groups.   
2. Accept that terrorist organizations adapt over time, and seek to influence the 
direction of that evolution. 
3. Seek strategies where defensive performance is robust in spite of changes in the 
terrorists’ strategy or tactics. 
The defender has the freedom to pursue one or more of these options when designing a 
defensive technology strategy. The following sections examine each path and example 
strategies. 
Designing Defenses That Can Adapt When Necessary 
The risk that adversaries will find ways around defensive measures clearly means that 
technology design efforts should include focused efforts to identify vulnerabilities that 
might be exploited and address them before the defenses are deployed. However, just as 
it is impossible to protect every target from every threat, resource constraints mean it is 
impossible to make every defensive technology impenetrable. As a result, a prudent 
homeland security technology strategy will recognize the potential for even well-
designed defensive technologies to be circumvented. In that case, the burden is pushed 
back on the defender and reconstituting protection will depend on the defense’s ability 
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to learn and adapt. How well it can do so depends in part on the organizations 
maintaining the defense and the characteristics of the defensive technologies they have 
installed.  
In natural coevolution, how effectively organisms change and respond is framed by 
how readily they vary, reproduce, pass on valuable traits, and how effectively nature 
eliminates individuals with poor characteristics. In comparison, organizations can have 
advantages and disadvantages in the speed and effectiveness of adaptive behavior. 
Organizations that can spread and implement proven strategies can speed their 
adaptation, without having to wait for the passage of time or attrition to reinforce good 
ideas. Conversely, organizations can also choose not to change. Bureaucratic friction, 
inertia, and politics can produce resistance to the spread of advantageous strategies and 
many organizations lack strong selective pressures to dispassionately drive poor 
strategies into extinction.26 As a result, choices and organizational characteristics that 
limit adaptive ability become disadvantages.   
Given that terrorists will seek to learn their way around defensive measures, 
technology strategies should be designed in a manner that recognizes this goal. This 
applies both to individual defensive technology systems and defensive technology 
strategies. If the characteristics of a technology system are essentially fixed, it is a static 
target for terrorist adaptive efforts and, once circumvented, may produce little defensive 
benefit. A focus on ways to build adaptability into defensive systems is therefore an 
absolute necessity. Similar arguments can be made for flexibility in the way 
organizations carryout their activities – e.g., how information is analyzed and deployed 
to counter the terrorist threat – to enable adaptation as circumstances change. Shifts in 
the ways that terrorists are applying technologies, such as the scenarios explored in our 
analysis of networked information and communications technologies,27 also will require 
agility to expand or change defensive technology portfolios in response. 
Forces that limit adaptability must also be considered and hedged against. Decisions 
that necessitate technological “lock in” and static properties will inevitably produce 
some vulnerability. The challenge in those situations is to manage that vulnerability to 
keep it within acceptable limits. Beyond the characteristics of specific technologies, 
choices made in how technologies are produced and used can also create vulnerability.  
Increasing dependence on individual systems for detection or communication might be 
problematic, for example, if a terrorist group learned how to deceive, spoof or penetrate 
the systems. If the capabilities provided by the technologies are woven too tightly into 
many preparedness and response systems, it might not be possible to “pull the plug” on 
the systems if they were compromised. The scale of investments made in specific 
technologies can similarly produce lock-in that constrains future adaptability. If the 
defense is pushed into making large-scale investments in a few defensive systems, the 
sunk costs, associated organizational structures, and commitments that coalesce around 
major programs may foreclose future alternatives. Depending on the nature of the 
threat, limiting the scale of current investments could be a strategy for preserving 
flexibility and adaptive agility.   
The argument for flexibility can be made both with regard to individual technologies 
and to expenditures on security in total. Because the commitment of resources to 
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security is a major impact of terrorism on targeted nations, preserving the flexibility to 
scale back security expenditures as circumstances warrant is also important. Decisions 
that lock-in resource commitments produce friction limiting their movement to other 
areas (whether for security against other threats or to other more productive 
applications) and, therefore, significantly limit adaptability and agility.  In nature, the 
tradeoff between commitment of energy and resources to defense versus 
growth/reproduction is particularly brutal – and devoting too much to defenses can 
produce negative outcomes as certainly as devoting too little.  As a result, organisms are 
observed to “give up” defensive behaviors or traits because of competing selective 
pressures to grow and reproduce. 28   
Just as use of a “variety” strategy by terrorist groups can help them adapt more 
rapidly to changing circumstances, having a variety of defensive options and diverse 
technologies available can provide versatility to the defender. In an extended conflict 
against a given terrorist organization, the terrorist may eventually overwhelm or 
circumvent even the most adaptable defensive technology. If and when that occurs, new 
options will be needed. Given the potential for such “adaptive destruction” of individual 
security approaches, planning must consider defensive technologies as a portfolio, 
maintaining possibilities for alternative approaches in the event currently effective 
technologies are neutralized. Such a strategy should ideally be applied to organizational 
capabilities broadly, rather than narrowly in the technology realm.29   
Building such a “palette” of capabilities will rarely be easy. While it may be simple 
enough to put certain types of technology “on the shelf” to be called upon if needed, 
capabilities that rely on individuals’ specialized expertise are more difficult to maintain. 
Preserving capabilities that are not currently high profile may also be difficult given 
pressures to use resources efficiently. However, this is one area where governments 
potentially have an advantage over non-state adversaries: large government 
organizations are more likely to have the resources needed to build and maintain a 
prudent portfolio of capabilities that can be called upon when needed.  
Understanding and Seeking to Influence Adversary Evolution  
Research on terrorist behaviors has shown that, even when defensive efforts do not fully 
“shut down” the activities of a terrorist organization, the nature and deployment of 
defenses strongly influence the perceived costs, benefits, and risk associated with 
possible courses of action. In response to defensive changes, groups have aborted 
operations and shifted their attention elsewhere, pursued new weapons procurement 
efforts, and instituted major security efforts to protect themselves from infiltration and 
arrest. This ability to influence behavior is at the heart of why an analogy to 
coevolutionary processes is useful and demonstrates that defenders have leverage to 
shape terrorist activities.   
To adapt and evolve, terrorist organizations have specific needs for information, 
capabilities, and other resources. If strategies are devised to prevent fulfilling those 
needs, their ability to adapt effectively can be blunted. For example, security 
organizations should consider whether the efficacy of a defensive technology hangs on 
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the ability to “keep secrets” about how it functions, how such secrets might be 
compromised, and whether a terrorist group could discern them from the outside.  
Technologies which rely on such approaches can be fragile. Technology designers should 
also consider whether testing – such as action-reaction challenging by adversary probes 
– could provide vulnerability data, whether groups willing to sacrifice low-level 
operatives in exploratory operations against the system can learn how to evade it, and 
whether the system’s characteristics are sufficiently observable that an adversary might 
see how its capabilities might be saturated and overwhelmed. To the extent that features 
can be incorporated that defeat or degrade the ability to gather such information, the 
ability of the technology to deter or defeat terrorist operations will be bolstered. 
The defense must also remain cognizant of other changes that might facilitate 
adaptation. For example, our examination of technology-transfer activities between 
terrorist groups demonstrated that such interactions can be significant influences on 
group capabilities and that a variety of incentives exist for groups to interact with one 
another. New technologies can facilitate group evolution as well. The integration of 
technical components in weapons systems that reduce the need for training and 
expertise before the systems can be used effectively could make the systems easier for 
non-state groups to use and increase their attractiveness. Shaping the incentives of 
potential knowledge sources is therefore important to limit how readily capabilities can 
spread among non-state groups. Such strategies do not apply where terrorists have 
many “commercial technology options,” such as information and communications 
technologies, as the broad availability of these technologies will defeat most attempts at 
control. 
However, the general conservatism observed in most terrorists’ choices of weaponry 
and acceptable levels of operational complexity – i.e., reliance on “tried-and-true” 
firearms and explosives applied in straightforward ways – suggests a sensitivity to costs 
and risks that could also be used to shape terrorists’ behavior. Traditional counter-
proliferation measures and efforts to deter specific types of attacks apply this strategy, 
seeking to limit the availability of key technologies and weapons, or increase the 
perceived costs and risks of particular courses of action. Our examination of next-
generation conventional weapons suggests opportunities for actions to influence 
terrorists’ calculus about the attractiveness of specific systems.30 In contrast to weapons 
they manufacture for themselves, commercial weapons are inherently “black box” 
technologies for terrorists: without a full understanding of their electronics and other 
components, the user must trust that the weapons will function as expected. 
Incorporating technical controls into such weapons (e.g., that provide positional 
information on the weapon or restrict its functioning to permitted geographic areas 
through the global positioning system) could increase perceived risks31 and deter their 
use. To the extent that such controls can be designed to force terrorists into “all or 
nothing bets” – the terrorists are uncertain that the weapon will function until it is 
deployed at the intended target – the deterrent value is likely to be greatest.32 
Similarly, defensive measures that force terrorists to make focused investments in 
individual areas can “lock them in” and limit their future options. One advantage the 
terrorist group has is the ability to walk away from choices that are no longer 
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advantageous – but, the larger the investment and greater the expertise a group has 
developed in a specific area, the harder it is to do so. Furthermore, design of defensive 
technologies that cannot be defeated by a group through a “one time investment” – e.g., 
even if an adversary develops a countermeasure, implementing it requires ongoing 
action and commitment of resources – are superior. Depending on the magnitude of its 
available resources, such a “drag” could constrain the group’s violent activities. 
Finally, defensive organizations have to foresee, to the extent possible how defensive 
choices might change the adversaries’ future incentives. Paradoxically, a group’s efforts 
to adapt and survive when faced with defensive actions can help it become a more 
potent threat than before the defenses were deployed. The most basic manifestation of 
this effect is the selective pressure technologies and other security measures exert on 
terrorist groups, eliminating the less talented individuals and reducing a group to a 
hardened core. But defensive measures could also direct terrorists’ choices in directions 
that are negative from the defenders’ perspective: if a particular security measure 
pushes terrorists toward attack modes for which no good defensive options exist, a 
country might be better off not implementing those measures or doing so only 
selectively–while pursuing the groups through other means that might be less likely to 
produce negative adaptation on the terrorists’ part. 33 To the extent possible, these later-
stage evolutionary pathways should be considered in the design of defensive 
technologies to ensure that short-term gains in security are not offset by the creation of 
larger long-term vulnerabilities.   
Although the use of defensive measures to shape terrorist behavior could be a useful 
part of a broad-based homeland security effort, doing so requires that we assess the 
success and failure of security efforts differently than usual. When used to shape 
behavior, the goal of technology may not be to prevent every terrorist operation; in some 
cases technology may explicitly allow certain types of activities by groups as part of an 
effort to shape their future behavior. From this perspective, “scoring” the conflict 
between the defender and attacker should not be done based on binary success or failure 
in preventing individual operations, but on the long-term evolution of terrorist groups 
and their ability to pose a significant threat to the nation. 
Identifying Robust Defensive Strategies 
The heterogeneity inherent in the terrorist threat means that homeland security 
organizations must craft a defensive technology strategy to be robust across a wide 
threat spectrum, rather than optimized for the threat posed by some particular terrorist 
group. To the extent that robust solutions can be identified that are not directly tied to 
the nature or specific characteristics of the threat, defenses will also be less sensitive to 
any changes individual terrorist groups make that shift the level or type of threat they 
pose.   
Examples of strategies that might provide “cross-resistance” to many threats include 
the design or retrofitting of fault tolerance and robustness into target systems so that 
damage will be minimized if attacks are carried out. Similarly, investments in rapid 
response and repair capabilities to provide resilience if a successful terrorist operation is 
JACKSON, TECHNOLOGY STRATEGIES FOR HOMELAND SECURITY 
 
 
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME V, NO. 1 (JANUARY 2009) WWW.HSAJ.ORG  
 
12 
carried out provide another option. Such approaches have a number of advantages when 
viewed with terrorists’ technology strategies in mind. Increases in the robustness and 
resilience of systems can be implemented via changes that fundamentally alter the 
characteristics of a potential target – e.g., a critical infrastructure network – and it is 
therefore difficult for the terrorist to counter the system’s defensive value. Many such 
measures may in fact be invisible to terrorist efforts to gather targeting information and 
may deter attack across the system because of the increased uncertainty in outcome. For 
example, rapid repair of a damaged bridge, which the terrorist hoped would cause 
severe disruption in transportation systems, will deny the adversary his intended 
outcome and significantly reduce the effect on the nation, even if the attack itself is not 
prevented. In circumstances where the outcomes the terrorists desire can be denied, 
even without acting against or seeking to disrupt the terrorists’ actions directly,34 the 
threat posed by the organization can be neutralized without providing it with clear 
incentives or signals about how to make future attacks more successful. 
Beyond general-purpose response strategies, building robustness into defensive 
strategies can also be achieved by considering individual defensive approaches within an 
overall “systems view” of homeland security. Though individual defensive approaches 
may be vulnerable to the counter-technology strategies described above, layered 
combinations of approaches and measures may be far less so. Implementing this 
approach requires consideration of the full set of defensive capabilities that can act to 
defeat or blunt the impact of terrorist action to assess how those capabilities will 
function as a composite defense. When added together, the effectiveness of defenses 
should no longer depend on “single links in a chain” – e.g., identification of a suspected 
terrorist at a border checkpoint or early detection of the release of a biological agent – 
where successful evasion by the terrorist or a single missed signal negates the value of 
the entire system. Instead, a focus on how even imperfect performance of multiple 
layers might reinforce one another and provide successive opportunities to detect and 
frustrate terrorist action can provide a more fault-tolerant defensive approach. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Thinking about terrorist and counterterrorist conflicts in a dynamic way is superior to 
viewing them as single, static engagements between adversaries.  However, simply 
saying such a conflict is dynamic and observing that terrorists adapt and change over 
time helps security planning only modestly.  It is indeed true that terrorist threats are 
heterogeneous and will shift over time, but planners shouldn’t therefore conclude that 
the answer is that they must protect every target from every conceivable attack mode.  
Such a strategy would quickly collapse either under weight of the resource levels 
required or by spreading defenses so thinly that the performance of the entire security 
effort was put at risk. 
In this discussion, we used coevolutionary theory and examples from the natural 
world to set up a different way to think about such dynamic conflicts.  The central 
advantage of approaching the problem this way is that it helps to break the tendency – 
particularly in the design of technical systems – of viewing security measures as 
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“solutions” to particular and static security problems or assuming that a technology that 
is effective in some part of that problem space now will be effective indefinitely.  This 
sets up different ways of thinking about the efficacy of defensive measures – in terms of 
the opportunities they provide to shape adversary behavior, the value of defenses being 
adaptive so they can be retargeted or modified to address changing threats, and the 
importance of seeking out defensive strategies whose performance is less sensitive to 
whether terrorist groups evolve or how they do so.  Whether pursued singly or in 
combination, these strategies can each contribute to building overall homeland security 
policies that are more robust in the face of the “adaptive destruction” threatened by 
terrorist groups coevolving under the selective pressures those measures exert on them. 
 
 
Brian A. Jackson is a senior physical scientist and the associate director of the Homeland 
Security Research Program at the RAND Corporation.  His research focuses on the 
technological aspects of the terrorist threat and design and assessment of homeland security 




The author acknowledges the contributions of other RAND staff members in the overall research 
effort on which this paper is based. In particular, David Frelinger and Kim Cragin helped to 
refine the specific ideas and provided valuable input to earlier drafts of the manuscript.  The 
research described in this paper was supported by Contract # W81XWH-05-F-0191 with the 
Department of Homeland Security, Science and Technology Directorate, Office of Comparative 
Studies. The views expressed are the author’s and do not necessarily reflect the views or policies 
of the RAND Corporation, DHS, or any of RAND’s other research sponsors. 
 
 
                                                
1 We have used the plural of this term to emphasize that many organizations contribute to the terrorism 
defense mission.  We will refer to this constellation of organizations as “homeland security agencies” and 
generically as the “defense” or “defender” in the fight against terrorist organizations. 
2 See Marjolijn S. Dijksterhuis, et al., “Where Do New Organizational Forms Come From? Management 
Logics as a Source of Coevolution,” Organization Science 10, No. 5 (1999): 569-582, or Arie Y. Lewin, et 
al., “The Coevolution of New Organizational Forms,” Organization Science 10, No. 5 (1999): 535-550, for 
examples of these principles applied to organizations. 
3 For example, in interviews with the author, law enforcement and intelligence practitioners have 
frequently cited the selective effect of counter- and anti-terrorism measures for removing less effective 
and skillful terrorists.    
4 Brian A. Jackson, et al., Breaching the Fortress Wall: Understanding Terrorist Efforts to Overcome 
Defensive Technologies, MG-481-DHS, RAND Corporation, 2007; Kim Cragin, et al., Sharing the 
Dragon’s Teeth: Terrorist Groups and the Exchange of New Technologies, MG-483-DHS, RAND 
Corporation, 2007; James Bonomo, et al, Stealing the Sword: Limiting Terrorist Use of Advanced 
Conventional Weapons, MG-510-DHS, RAND Corporation, 2007; Bruce Don, et al., Network 
JACKSON, TECHNOLOGY STRATEGIES FOR HOMELAND SECURITY 
 
 
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME V, NO. 1 (JANUARY 2009) WWW.HSAJ.ORG  
 
14 
                                                                                                                                                       
Technologies for Networked Terrorists: Assessing the Value of Information and Communication 
Technologies to Modern Terrorist Organizations, TR-454-DHS, RAND Corporation, 2007.  
5 See, for example, Brian Michael Jenkins, “High Technology Terrorism and Surrogate War: The Impact of 
New Technology on Low-Level Violence,” RAND Paper 5339 (RAND Corporation, January 1975), 15; J. 
Bowyer Bell, The Gun in Politics: An Analysis of Irish Political Conflict, 1916-1986 (New Brunswick, NJ: 
Transaction Books, 1987), 50. 
6 For example, discussion in Bruce Hoffman, “Change and Continuity in Terrorism,” April 17, 2000,  
http://www.mipt.org/hoffman-ctb.asp.  
7 Including not only financial costs but also time, personnel, and other resources needed for adoption.   
8 For discussion, of costs and benefits from the terrorists’ perspective, see Brian A. Jackson, "Technology 
Acquisition by Terrorist Groups: Threat Assessment Informed by Lessons from Private Sector Technology 
Adoption," Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 24, 2001, pp. 183-213. 
9 Advanced weapons like antiaircraft missiles provide a useful example: clearly their value to some groups 
is sufficient to enable use, though the spotty results gained by doing so emphasize some of the risks of new 
technologies.  See, for example, Marvin B. Schaffer, “The Missile Threat to Civil Aviation,” Terrorism and 
Political Violence 10, No.3 (1998): 70-82. 
10 See Kim Cragin, et al., Sharing the Dragon’s Teeth: Terrorist Groups and the Exchange of New 
Technologies, MG-483-DHS (RAND Corporation, 2007). 
11 This case is analogous to the observation in biology that organisms may maintain traits that are not 
currently advantageous, but may become valuable if their circumstances change. 
12 See Brian A. Jackson, Aptitude for Destruction, Volume 1: Organizational Learning by Terrorist 
Groups and Its Implications for Combating Terrorism, MG-331-NIJ (RAND Corporation, 2005); and 
Brian A. Jackson, et al, Aptitude for Destruction, Volume 2: Case Studies of Learning in Five Terrorist 
Groups, MG-332-NIJ (RAND Corporation, 2005) for a broader discussion of factors shaping group 
learning capability. 
13 See Brian A. Jackson and David Frelinger, “Rifling Through the Terrorists’ Arsenal: Exploring Groups’ 
Weapon Choices and Technology Strategies,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 31, No. 7 (2008): 583-604, 
for an empirical look at differences in group weapons technology strategies. 
14 Edmund D. Brodie III and Edmund D. Brodie Jr., “Predator-Prey Arms Races,” BioScience 49, No. 7 
(1999): 557-68. 
15 Similar arguments could be made for terrorists that became specialized in using particular weapons 
(e.g., mortar experts) or in attacking particular classes of targets (e.g., armed assaults on specific 
infrastructure targets.) 
16 For example, J.S. Rana, et al., “Costs and benefits of prey specialization in a generalist insect predator” 
Journal of Animal Ecology 71, No. 1 (2002): 15-22.  
17 Specialization by the offense can simplify the field for the defender. Resource investments in 
specialization lock in the terrorist group to some extent along specific trajectories. For a particular group, 
knowledge of specialization can make it possible to shape more specific defenses to the group’s actions.  
This therefore exposes a larger fraction of the group’s capabilities to risks (that are difficult for the 
terrorist to predict) and generate disincentives to specialization for some groups. 
18 See discussion in Brian A. Jackson, et al., Breaching the Fortress Wall: Understanding Terrorist 
Efforts to Overcome Defensive Technologies, MG-481-DHS (RAND Corporation, 2007). 
19 See Joel Kniskern and Mark D. Rausher, “Two Modes of Host-Enemy Coevolution,” Popul Ecol 43 
(2001): 3-14, for discussion of information coevolution. 
20 Bruce Don, et al., Network Technologies for Networked Terrorists: Assessing the Value of Information 
and Communication Technologies to Modern Terrorist Organizations, TR-454-DHS (RAND 
JACKSON, TECHNOLOGY STRATEGIES FOR HOMELAND SECURITY 
 
 
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME V, NO. 1 (JANUARY 2009) WWW.HSAJ.ORG  
 
15 
                                                                                                                                                       
Corporation, 2007).  The potential for novel weapons to provide technological opportunities for 
substitution in response to defenses is also relevant. James Bonomo, et al, Stealing the Sword: Limiting 
Terrorist Use of Advanced Conventional Weapons, MG-510-DHS (RAND Corporation, 2007). 
21 Enders and Sandler have done comprehensive analyses of such behavior for transnational terrorism 
including displacement effects among target classes. Walter Enders and Todd Sandler, "What Do We 
Know About the Substitution Effect in Transnational Terrorism?" in Andrew Silke, ed., Research on 
Terrorism: Trends, Achievements and Failures (London, England: Frank Cass, 2004), 119-137. 
22 See Brian .A. Jackson, “Groups, Networks, or Movements: A Command-and-Control-Driven Approach 
to Classifying Terrorist Organizations and Its Application to al Qaeda,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 
29 (2006): 241-262, for discussion of a classification scheme for terrorist organizations applicable to their 
technology decision making and strategy development. 
23 This creates dynamics on the defensive side regarding how much is revealed and obscured regarding the 
nature and functioning of defensive measures. To the extent that such secrets can be kept, terrorist 
learning – and this particular component of the threat – can be blunted or delayed. 
24 See Brian A. Jackson, Aptitude for Destruction, Volume 1: Organizational Learning by Terrorist 
Groups and Its Implications for Combating Terrorism, MG-331-NIJ (RAND Corporation, 2005) for 
additional discussion of targeting groups learning activities as part of counterterrorist efforts. 
25 Emphasizing the relevance of lessons learned from past defense planning, these principles echo the 
results of some examinations of national defense policy after the Cold War.  See, for example, Paul K. 
Davis, et al., “Adaptiveness in National Defense: The Basis of a New Framework,” RAND Corporation 
Issue Paper (RAND Corporation, August 1996). 
26 In contrast to the real selective pressure that counterterrorist efforts exert on terrorist organizations 
and their members – providing mechanisms where poor strategies are indeed eliminated through arrest 
or attrition. 
27 Bruce Don, et al., Network Technologies for Networked Terrorists: Assessing the Value of Information 
and Communication Technologies to Modern Terrorist Organizations, TR-454-DHS (RAND 
Corporation, 2007). 
28 See, for example, Daniel A.  Herms and William J. Mattson, “The Dilemma of Plants: To Grow or 
Defend,” The Quarterly Review of Biology, 67:3, 1992, pp. 283-335 or Abrams, Peter and Hiroyuki 
Matsuda, “Effects of Adaptive Predatory and Anti-Predatory Behaviour in a Two-Prey—One-Predator 
System,” Evolutionary Ecology, 7:3, 1993, pp. 312-326. 
29 For example, maintaining capability in a variety of intelligence collection and analysis techniques is 
valuable, even if only a subset of them are high value at a given time.  As circumstances change, 
techniques that are currently not applicable may become important as terrorist behavior changes or new 
intelligence data sources become available. 
30 James Bonomo, et al, Stealing the Sword: Limiting Terrorist Use of Advanced Conventional Weapons, 
MG-510-DHS (RAND Corporation, 2007). 
31 Both to the effective functioning of the weapon (and, therefore, risk to the success of any operation in 
which it was used) and security risks to the organization overall through the potential for tracking the 
weapons. 
32 Such arguments similarly apply to defensive measures more broadly, not just those related to 
controlling the use of advanced weaponry.  
33 For example, for a notional terrorist group, the broad implementation of defensive measures against the 
use of small explosive devices could produce a strong pressure to adopt vehicle bombs to reconstitute the 
group’s ability to strike attractive targets.  Since the use of vehicle bombs would significantly increase the 
group’s destructive capability and could be more difficult to counter, it might be a better defensive 
strategy to either not deploy the defenses or do so at only the most vulnerable targets (thereby reducing 
JACKSON, TECHNOLOGY STRATEGIES FOR HOMELAND SECURITY 
 
 
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME V, NO. 1 (JANUARY 2009) WWW.HSAJ.ORG  
 
16 
                                                                                                                                                       
the evolutionary pressure on the group to seek out alternative attack modes), while focusing resources to 
pursing the group’s members through law enforcement action.  Though law enforcement action aimed at a 
group would produce evolutionary pressures of its own, those pressures might be less likely to move the 
group towards more destructive attack types. 
34 Such an approach could be termed building in asymmetry into defensive measures where advantage is 
preserved for the defender across a range of possible attack options and scenarios. Such strategies are also 
attractive because they can provide robustness and resilience against threats that have nothing to do with 
terrorism – e.g., robustness of electricity infrastructures to outages produced by storms or natural 
disasters – and therefore produce benefit streams to the defender irrespective of the realized terrorist 
threat environment. 
